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alleged. But, said the court, "once the plaintiff has stated a
cause of action and established that the accident occurred
through the negligence of the wife in her use of the community
car, which she was operating with the permission and consent
(actual or implied) of the husband, since the husband has
peculiar knowledge of facts which would relieve him of liability
it then devolves upon him should he seek to avoid responsibility
to show, to the satisfaction of the court, that the wife was on a
mission of her own." 4
Thus the question resolves itself into one of pleading and
proof in which the plaintiff carries the burden of alleging all
the necessary elements and of proving all but one, viz., that the
wife was on a community errand, as to which the defendant
husband carries the burden of persuasion to the contrary.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
The opinion of the court in McGuffy v. Weill contains an
interesting discussion of the legal nature of a restriction against
the use of land. In connection with the sale of a city lot, the
parties signed a separate contract in authentic form under the
terms of which the vendor agreed that an adjoining lot would
never be used except for residential purposes. It was provided
that this restriction would constitute a covenant running with
the land, binding upon all subsequent owners. The contract was
recorded. Thereafter, the plaintiff, a successor in title to the.
original vendor, sought a declaratory judgment that the lot was
free of the restriction. In holding against the plaintiff, the court
found the restriction to be a continuous, non-apparent servitude,
and concluded that, having been recorded in the form of a
notarial act, it was "established by title" although it was not
included in the act of sale itself. Consequently it was held bind-
ing. This classification is helpful. In addition, the decision may
tend to overcome the impression obtainable from some earlier
cases that a restriction of this kind is valid only if contained in
a general scheme or plan of land development. Such a qualifica-
4. Martin v. Brown, 240 La. 674, 683, 124 So.2d 904, 908 (1960).
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1. 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960).
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tion may properly bear on the question of whether a third person
may enforce this kind of provision as beneficiary of a stipulation
pour autrui, but it should not be controlling in determining
whether the restriction constitutes a real obligation to which
the land is subjected.
The question of the continued effectiveness of a general
scheme or plan of land development despite some violations of
the restrictions imposed was considered carefully and at length
by the court in Guyton v. Yancey. 2 It was found that the plan
as conceived and established by the subdividers had not been
abandoned or discarded and continued to be legally effective.
The court also found that an imperceptible violation by the plain-
tiff himself of the front set-back requirements did not debar
him from complaining of the threatened flagrant violation by





Privileges are a form of security device in Louisiana law
and when they affect immovable property there is a close resem-
blance to mortgage. For mortgages, there is an inexorable rule
that there must be proper recordation in order to affect third
persons. For privileges which affect immovables, the same is
generally true, but there are some exceptions.' In the case of
such an exception, the privilege attaches to the property just
as if it had been recorded, and the lack of recordation does not
abbreviate or limit the scope of the effectiveness of the privilege,
even as against third persons. At this time, there is no question
of sympathy for the property owners who have so many other
burdens, or the title examiners who already have a fantastic
job in comparison to the simple checking of titles under a Tor-
rens system type of recordation. Neither is this the time for
sympathy to the patient funeral director, the devoted doctor,
or the necessitous widow. These policy considerations were all
2. 240 La. 794, 125 So.2d 365 (1961).
1. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 19 (1921) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3276 (1870).
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